Introduction
The moral status of the corporation is a foundational issue in business ethics. A longrunning debate has considered whether a corporation can be considered a moral agent in its own right, akin to an individual human agent. As Moore (1999, p. 330) comments, the views are 'essentially twofold and diametrically opposed'. Some think corporations 1 are moral agents, while others disagree.
As befits such a long-running and important debate, 2 several review articles have been produced (e.g. Danley, 1999) , in addition to the literature reviews that precede any attempts at novel analysis. Moore's (1999) review covers most, if not all, of the many significant papers on this topic over the years, 3 considering the principal arguments on both sides of the debate. As he notes, the debate on the moral status of the corporation can be seen as a particular case regarding collective responsibility -an issue that has been extensively discussed in the general philosophy literature, where concerns have included attribution of blame to particular races or nation states.
In this chapter, rather than revisiting the business ethics literature and reviewing it anew, I take a step back and undertake a review of the philosophical literature on collective responsibility. This is not to imply that previous business ethicists have not also referred to the philosophical literature. However, in reviewing that literature I wish to bring out a particular issue that I regard as having been ignored or under-played by previous authors -namely, the distribution of blame. I pay particular attention to the work of Sverdlik (1987) who, like most other protagonists in the debate within the philosophical literature, is concerned with the general nature of collective responsibility rather than its particular application in relation to business corporations.
The term 'collective responsibility' clearly involves two elements. As in the literature on collective responsibility, the element on which I wish to focus in this paper is 'collective'. However, I will first make a few points about 'responsibility', with the principal aim not of finding some essentialist definition but of ensuring that it is sufficiently clear for the purposes of this chapter how I am using the term. 4 Given the tenor of the debate on corporations, I am particularly interested in blame and its relationship to responsibility and obligation.
On responsibility and blame
'Responsibility' and 'obligation' are closely related terms in everyday discourse.
Thus, for example, if I fail in my legal obligation to drive with due care and attention, I am liable to be held legally responsible for the consequences. This reflects the etymological roots of the word; Lucas (1993) notes the origins of the word 'responsibility' in the Latin respondeo, I answer, 5 and an important element in the meaning of the term is the idea of being answerable for one's actions. In everyday speech, we are accustomed to speaking of being responsible for something before the event (often some form of obligation), but such usage nevertheless carries with it an implication of being answerable or accountable after the event. The philosophical literature seems to concentrate on this ex post aspect of responsibility. Thus, 4 Even then, I am less interested in providing a rigorous definition than in providing a broad indication sufficient to get the argument moving. I hope that readers will be able to regard 'responsibility', 'blame' and related terms as placeholders into which they can insert their own definitions without doing damage to the argument. 5 See also Lewis (1948) . Eshleman (2004) , for example, summarizes the notion of being morally responsible for something, such as an action, as being 'worthy of a particular kind of reactionpraise, blame, or something akin to these -for having performed it'. I suggest that both academic literature (e.g. textbooks and case studies) and popular discourse (e.g.
newspapers) tend to focus on ex post blame when it comes to the putative responsibilities of business corporations -especially in the case of 'scandals', which do so much to raise the profile of business ethics as an issue (Cowton, 2008 ).
An 'action' considered blameworthy may include the failure to do something that was demanded of me, an obligation (Dent, 2005) . Whether I should be praised for something I was obliged to do is a moot point, but in the literature on collective responsibility, the focus is very much on blaming (Smiley, 2005); and Sverdlik (1987) , whose paper I examine in greater depth below, for the purposes of his analysis treats responsibility as meaning, roughly, blameworthiness.
Thus, although the work of authors such as H.L.A. Hart (see Finnis, 2005) demonstrates that responsibility is a rich and complex concept, in the literature on collective responsibility it can be characterized as being concerned with blameworthiness for failure to meet some obligation, where that obligation is here taken to be a moral one in some sense. 6 And it is the 'collective' aspect of 'collective responsibility' that attracts the most debate. In the following section, I review the principal strands of the debate in the philosophical literature. 6 There is an interesting exchange in which Downie (1969) accuses Cooper (1968) of having failed to identify moral responsibility in his tennis club example (an example that I find unpersuasive in any case), to which Cooper (1969) responds that his papers had the 'escape clause' of stating 'moral or social responsibility'. Downie's error, while perhaps suggesting a lack of close reading, is indicative of the general assumption that collective responsibility means collective moral responsibility.
On 'collective' responsibility
The construal of groups as moral agents in their own right is controversial; as Sverdlik (1987, p.61) comments, talk of collective responsibility is 'apt to excite deeplyconflicting sentiments'. On the one hand, it engenders hostility because of association with thinking, such as heredity guilt and racism, which treats an individual on the basis of their membership of some group rather than on the basis of what they themselves have done. On the other hand, 'it is said that the notion of individual responsibility is to some degree outmoded in an era when much human activity is organized collectively and cooperatively' (Sverdlik, 1987, p.61) , for example nationstates declaring and conducting war -to which, one might add, corporations playing a central role in modern economies and societies. One fear is that the ability to attribute moral blame in relation to some of the most morally-troubling events might be lost.
7
Some of those who are in favour of attributing moral blame to 'collectives', as moral agents in their own right, point out that this is the way we talk -a common sense move, reflecting ordinary language. Others, cognisant of how language can mislead, do not necessarily rely on this but nevertheless point to the fact that collectives can and do perform actions (Copp, 1979) .
Not surprisingly, such a view has come under attack. Normative individualists argue that the notion of collective responsibility is unfair and violates principles of individual responsibility. They see undesirable echoes of 'taint' (see Appiah, 1986-87) or 'tribalism' (see McGary, 1986 ) when collective responsibility is being advocated. At a basic level, to blame an individual for an action they have not done is unfair. I work for a particular university; indeed, I hold a senior position within it.
Yet to hold me responsible for any and all morally blameworthy actions carried out in 7 See French's (1972) Lewis (1948) , who -apparently motivated by concerns over 'war guilt' -begins by asserting that responsibility belongs essentially to the individual, though he does surprisingly little in the remainder of the paper to argue his case. 9 Stronger arguments have been made around the issues of intention and agency; groups, it is claimed, cannot form an intention and so cannot be blamed; they do not engage in 'genuinely collective actions' (Smiley, 2005 , emphasis added).
Possible responses to methodological individualists include: first, that while intention is important, the role of negligence in attributing moral blame suggests that it is not essential (see Appiah, 1986-87) ; and second, that although groups do not form intentions as such, they have equivalent processes that mean that we can talk of collectives taking decisions and performing deliberate actions. This seems a reasonable point, and to deny it seems little more than to reassert that individuals can be held responsible and groups cannot. French pursues such an approach when focusing on corporations, employing the notion of the 'corporation's internal decision structure'. As later writers have pointed out, there are some problems with his notion, but I do not think it fundamentally undermines the general point that business corporations, at least, amongst collectives could be considered to form intentions.
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This latter point has led many defenders of collective responsibility to be careful to identify it only with certain cases, and business corporations are an obvious example -perhaps the classic case, as apparently rational, goal-seeking and organized collectives. Thus, the people on the train in Feinberg's (1968) example, subject to a Jesse James robbery, are not a group; in Held's terms (Held, 1970) , they are just a 9 Though as Smiley (2005) correctly observes, his paper does contain 'moral outrage', which suggests that his motivation is normative rather than strictly methodological. 10 My position is that I do not find intention to be a crucial issue. I give one reason below, but I note that it cannot be relevant for a normative individualist. (Lukes, 1973, p.47 ).
This line of reasoning is consistent with a strand of writing on collective responsibility that investigates how moral responsibility can be distributed across members of a group -and which, in a sense, is therefore not really about collective responsibility at all (Smiley, 2005) , at least in the sense intended by many writers. In the following paragraphs, I discuss Sverdlik's (1987) paper in order to examine the issues involved more closely.
Although not the most recent analysis of collective responsibility, Sverdlik's paper does take account of most of the earlier literature, which had already identified many of the central issues previously mentioned in this paper. In summarizing his argument, I will omit the detail of his examples and concentrate on the substantive points.
Having noted the deeply-conflicting sentiments that talk of collective responsibility is apt to excite, Sverdlik (1987, p.61 Sverdlik remarks that one may accept one and deny the other, but he is correct in remarking that one is more likely to accept collective responsibility than corporate responsibility 'since the latter has many more presuppositions, both ontological and moral ' (pp.62-63) . For example, he comments that, for corporate responsibility to obtain, it is necessary to establish that groups exist and can act rationally. As I have already indicated, that does not seem unreasonable, at least in some circumstances, even if groups are never exactly like individuals. He also states that for his definition of corporate responsibility to obtain, it is necessary that such groups can be properly blamed if they neglect to do obligatory actions. That is really just a restatement of the problem.
14 I suggest below, though, that later in his paper, he slips into using 'collective responsibility' in the conventional manner, without reference to his distinction.
Indeed, his point about which form of responsibility is the more likely to be accepted carries little or no weight as a part of his argument. We know that the controversial issue is whether groups can be blamed. The general philosophical treatment of moral responsibility is rooted in a consideration of individuals, and the underlying issue in the debate being considered here is whether groups, quâ groups, are different from individuals in respects which some writers take to be critical. The thought that people are more likely to accept his notion of collective responsibility (based on individuals) than his notion of corporate responsibility because the latter is more problematic is thus the starting point for his argument, not a move in it. It is thus, again, just a restatement of the problem and begs the issue.
The next distinction Sverdlik makes is more important, namely one between responsibility for results or outcomes 15 on the one hand and responsibility for acts on the other. He goes on to comment that '[r]esponsibility for outcomes is a matter of being responsible for acts that contribute to the existence of the outcome' (p.65).
Furthermore, he notes that '[w]herever there is responsibility for a result, there is responsibility for an action that causes, at least in part, that outcome, but the converse is not true' (p.65). There might be no external outcome (of any moral significance) for two possible reasons. First, the nature of some acts means that they need not have external outcomes; Sverdlik cites as examples dance, masturbation and pre-marital sex. 16 Second, an act might fail in its intended outcome; for example, I shoot at someone but the bullet harmlessly misses. 17 On the other hand, it does not seem possible to think of cases where responsibility for an outcome cannot be paraphrased as involving the person's being responsible for an action that at least partly produced 15 He uses the two terms interchangeably. 16 I leave it to the reader to decide whether these examples are the most appropriate or helpful. 17 See my earlier comments on intention too. the result, leading Sverdlik to conclude that 'responsibility for actions is logically the more fundamental idea ' (p.66) . From this, it is possible to infer that 'more than one person can be morally responsible for an outcome even though it is true that every person is only responsible for his or her own actions' (p.66). These points are fundamental to Sverdlik's argument, and he uses them to provide a telling insight into the debate on collective versus corporate responsibility.
Sverdlik's reading of the debate, with which I tend to concur, is that advocates of collective 18 responsibility hold that more than one person can be responsible for an outcome, whereas their opponents tend to say that a person is responsible only for his or her own actions. He then argues that the latter is the more fundamental idea and summarizes the result of his argument as follows. Lewis, 1948) . I would further suggest that simply 'leaving' blame as resting with BP, rather than treating it as a first approximation, risks failing to identify and blame culpable individuals. This should not be taken to imply that those individuals acted alone though; it is of the essence of corporations that they are collaborative endeavours. The point is that individuals have responsibilities in such settings.
My position respects, for certain purposes, ordinary language. I have argued that it is reasonable to talk as if business corporations have moral responsibilities, but at least when it comes to the identification of blame, the process should seek to identify culpable individuals and, in doing so, absolve from blame other individuals.
Thus, as explained earlier, my position is not eliminativist (I still talk of business corporations), but when it comes to moral blame it is ultimately reductionist, based on normative individualism.
For the business ethics literature I suggest that this implies at least two things.
First, I hope we can move on from the corporate moral agency debate. Corporations cannot, in the final analysis, be subject to moral blame -yet we may continue to speak of them as if they can be as a kind of first approximation or shorthand. I think this gives Moore (1999) Thus, I suggest that we can engage in some talk of apparent corporate moral agency without needing to find a convincing theoretical justification for corporate moral agency as such. 24 Second, there is a need to understand how to distribute blame within business corporations. This will be a practical task contingent upon the circumstances of particular cases. The complexity of particular cases might make this challenging, but the organized nature of business corporations ought to support the tracing of responsibility; and if it is not possible to trace responsibility in detail, this might be taken to be an issue of governance and responsibility allocated accordingly.
A focus on the principles and practicalities of the distribution of responsibility and, where circumstances demand it, blame in business corporations seems to me to be a more productive endeavour than seeking (and failing, in my view) to establish that corporations are moral agents in their own right.
